IT/OT Convergence: How Automation Blurs the Air Gap
Cloud analytics and remote monitoring pull control networks toward business systems. The public record raises doubts about how common air gaps ever were.
IT/OT convergence is the connection of operational technology (OT), the systems that run physical equipment, with information technology (IT), the systems that handle business data. It is happening because operators want equipment data outside the plant, for remote monitoring, predictive maintenance, and analytics that increasingly run in the cloud. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) says this integration leaves OT with significantly less isolation from the outside world than earlier systems had.
The common shorthand is that OT once sat behind a hard air gap and automation is now erasing it. The record supports part of that. Control systems did start out isolated, and connections have grown. U.S. government documents were also listing modems, vendor links, and business network connections to control systems by 2002, and in 2011 a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official told Congress that his assessors had never found a control network separated from the business network. The line has been moving for decades, and in many places it may never have been as hard as the phrase suggests.
The Picture People Have in Mind
An air-gapped network, in the Congressional Research Service's definition, is one that connects to no other network, including the internet. NIST's account of OT history fits that picture in broad terms. It says early OT was isolated and ran proprietary protocols on specialized hardware and software, and that traditional OT was designed to run safely without connections to external networks.
NIST describes two changes. Low-cost Ethernet, Internet Protocol, and wireless devices replaced older proprietary equipment. Organizations also adopted IT technology to gain corporate connectivity and remote access. NIST gives the motive as business agility and cost reduction, which are pulling OT into business networks and cloud infrastructure.
What Is Driving the Connections
Joint guidance published in January 2026 by the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the FBI, and agencies in Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand names the benefits directly: real-time analytics, predictive maintenance, and remote monitoring and administration. CISA's summary of the guidance refers to increasing business and regulatory pressure for connectivity into OT networks.
Start with remote work and remote monitoring. In a 2020 alert, the National Security Agency (NSA) and CISA said internet-accessible OT assets were becoming more common as companies increased remote operations and monitoring, supported a decentralized workforce, and outsourced skills such as instrumentation and control. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which sets reliability standards for the grid, described the same shift in a 2023 data request. Access to grid equipment traditionally went to people in physical proximity to it. Remote access now extends to staff who maintain, configure, or troubleshoot control systems. NERC asked generation and transmission entities to report third parties with remote access, and said, without giving a number, that there are instances of the grid being controlled from outside the United States.
Predictive maintenance moves equipment data to analysts who may sit far from the plant. The Electric Power Research Institute reported in 2018 that Duke Energy ran monitoring and diagnostic centers in three states, analyzing sensor data on hundreds of key components, and that staff there made more than 400 catches in 2017. Equipment makers also reach into plants remotely. GE Vernova's gas power monitoring unit reported in December 2023 that customers had granted its tuning staff remote access under contract. Researchers have studied cloud-based versions in some settings. Researchers at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Blue Wave AI Labs analyzed moving nuclear predictive maintenance from onsite to the cloud, reported significant advantages, and considered regulatory requirements for non-safety-related systems. That was a feasibility analysis.
Some of the pull comes from the products themselves. INL wrote in October 2024 that many digital devices automatically send data to the internet for processing by the vendor, that a vendor portal is sometimes the only way to view certain data, and that some vendors may void warranties if cloud connections are cut. The shape of the grid adds more endpoints. Sandia National Laboratories noted in 2017 that power systems traditionally used dedicated channels to large generators and utility-owned assets, while solar systems often communicate with utilities and aggregators over the public internet.
How Far the Cloud Has Reached Into Grid Operations
Adoption is uneven, and real-time grid operation is the cautious end of it. NERC told the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in December 2021 that entities had securely used cloud services for activities outside its Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards, such as reliability studies and forecasting. NERC also said the CIP standards did not expressly prohibit cloud use for real-time reliability functions, but that they were written without certain cloud security features in mind. INL's 2024 paper describes utilities moving data management, email, and business operations to the cloud, and describes moving operational and control functions as something still being contemplated.
The rules are moving too. FERC's Order No. 919, a final rule effective May 26, 2026, approved 11 modified CIP standards intended to let entities adopt virtualization. The standards themselves become enforceable later, after an implementation period. A separate NERC drafting team on third-party cloud services opened its second informal comment period in July 2026 and expected a formal posting in the fourth quarter of 2026, pending feedback. Its stated scope is to allow cloud use without requiring it. As of November 5, 2026, NERC's project page showed that comment period closed on August 21 and listed no formal posting or ballot.
What Changes When the Line Moves
The business network becomes a route to the control network. In the December 2015 attack on Ukrainian electricity distribution companies, an analysis by the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center and the SANS Institute describes spear phishing into business networks, theft of credentials, and virtual private network (VPN) connections into the control network that appeared to lack two-factor authentication. The attackers then used operator screens to open breakers. At least 27 substations went offline and roughly 225,000 customers were affected. In a February 2024 advisory, CISA, the NSA, the FBI, and other U.S. agencies assessed with high confidence that the group they call Volt Typhoon was positioning itself on IT networks to enable movement to OT assets. Energy was one of four sectors where they said confirmed compromises were concentrated.
An IT incident can also stop physical operations with no evidence of an OT compromise. Colonial Pipeline's chief executive testified in June 2021 that the attack encrypted the company's IT systems, and that Colonial shut down 5,500 miles of pipeline to keep the malware from reaching the OT network, if it had not already. He said that when Colonial learned of the attack, it knew neither where the attack began nor its scope. He later told the committee the company saw no indications of compromise in the OT system, while noting that the investigation was continuing. A Mandiant executive testified that the intruder logged in through a legacy VPN profile that required no one-time passcode.
Remote access at small, unstaffed sites becomes part of the risk. CERT Polska, a Polish national incident response team, reported on attacks on at least 30 wind and solar farms on 29 December 2025. It says such grid connection substations are typically unmanned and remotely managed. At each affected site, a single device served as VPN concentrator and firewall, with its VPN interface exposed to the internet and no multi-factor authentication. Damage to remote terminal units cut communication with the distribution system operator and prevented remote control. CERT Polska reports that electricity generation continued.
Older equipment makes this harder. The 2020 NSA and CISA alert points to legacy OT assets that were not designed to defend against malicious cyber activity. Connections also create a new kind of dependency. The NCSC guidance asks operators whether a business system outage could shut down an OT process, and whether operations can continue manually if links are lost. Those are reliability questions as much as security ones.
Was the Air Gap Ever as Common as the Story Says?
The available evidence suggests complete isolation was less common than the story implies, at least in the systems government assessors examined.
A control system spread across a region has to reach its field sites. NIST describes supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems using telephone lines, cable, fiber, and radio, and says field sites often have remote access for diagnostics and repairs, usually over a separate dial-up modem or wide area network connection.
The early federal documents treated such links as something to expect. A 2002 booklet from the Department of Energy and the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks, opens by telling operators to identify every connection to the SCADA network, including business networks, the internet, modems, and links to partners, vendors, and regulators. Its second step is to disconnect the unnecessary ones. In 2004, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) wrote that enterprises often integrate their control systems with enterprise networks, and that organizations often leave dial-up modems open for remote diagnostics and maintenance.
The same report used the word convergence and recorded a nuclear example. GAO reported that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed the Slammer worm infected a network at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio in January 2003, disabling a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours. A report in The Register at the time, citing the operator's email to the commission and an industry advisory, traced the worm through a contractor's network and a leased line that bypassed the plant's firewall, then from the business network to the plant network. It says the plant was already offline, an analog backup was unaffected, and the event posed no safety hazard.
The strongest single statement came in May 2011. Sean McGurk, who directed DHS's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, told a House subcommittee that across hundreds of private sector vulnerability assessments, DHS had never found an operations network, SCADA system, or energy management system separated from the enterprise network. He said assessors saw an average of 11 direct connections between those networks, and up to 250 in extreme cases.
Those figures have limits. They describe the sites DHS assessed, and McGurk did not name sectors or present them as a sample of the whole economy. As of November 2026, we found no public dataset that measures what share of OT networks are truly air-gapped, then or now. The assessments were also voluntary, so the sites chose to be examined. Isolated systems exist too. NIST notes that many OT environments contain isolated systems or components, or systems on non-IP networks. A 2023 Environmental Protection Agency case study describes a water utility that calls its SCADA air gapped, though the same document lists a dedicated intranet and a permanent VPN tunnel to the main office.
That case study also shows why an air gap settles less than it seems to. The utility said the measure is preventive but not absolute. It still has to control staff and vendor access, apply updates, and scan outside devices that plug into SCADA, and staff demand has it considering remote access for some users. The Congressional Research Service made a related point in 2010 when it wrote that the Stuxnet worm could spread through an air-gapped network on a removable device such as a thumb drive. NIST's SP 800-82 Rev. 3 says that relying on traditional measures such as air gaps is not enough as OT connects to IT networks.
What Current Guidance Puts in Its Place
Current guidance treats each connection as a decision to justify and design. The NCSC principles start with a documented business case for every connection, covering what it is for, its benefits, its risks, the dependencies it adds, and a senior risk owner. They call for connections to start from inside the OT environment and go outbound. Outside parties such as remote vendors should reach OT through a broker in a demilitarized zone (DMZ), a buffer network between OT and everything else. Where data needs to be shared, the guidance suggests copying the OT historian to a second historian in the DMZ over a one-way transfer, so that IT systems query the copy. NIST describes unidirectional gateways, or data diodes, that permit communication in only one direction, and says remote access should be provided only when justified and limited to the business need. These measures build on network segmentation, and NIST cites the Purdue Model as one way to organize it.
Isolation has also come back as a planned capability. The eighth NCSC principle asks operators to keep a tested isolation plan, including what supplier contracts require if remote support has to become a site visit. In July 2026, CISA and the Australian Cyber Security Centre published CI Fortify, which gives critical infrastructure organizations steps to isolate vital OT from all other networks during a crisis and keep operating that way for an extended period.
When a system is described as air-gapped, the useful questions are concrete: which connections exist, who can use them and when, which way data flows, and whether the process can keep running if they are cut.
Related articles
Sources
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